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The Effect of the JOBS Act on Underwriting Spreads
Usha Rodrigues'
INTRODUCTION
T ITLE I of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act)aimed to "reopen American capital markets," that is, to stimulate initial
public offerings. To that end, it introduced a new category of issuers, so-called
emerging growth companies (EGCs), and provided those companies with
relief from significant features of the securities laws, so as to entice them into
the public market.
It has been over a year since the passage of the JOBS Act, and information
concerning its impact has begun to come in. Drawing on that data, this Article
examines the effect of certain provisions of Tide I on underwriter fees.
At the outset, some definitions are in order. An underwriting investment
bank (or, more precisely, a group of banks, known as a syndicate) serves as
the intermediary between an issuer and the investors who purchase shares
at the initial public offering, or IPO. In virtually every IPO transaction, the
underwriter buys shares from the issuer at a discount, known as the underwriting
spread, underwriter discount, or gross spread, and then sells them to the public
at the offering price.3 Underwriters provide a number of services: they help
prepare and vet registration statements to be filed with the SEC; they iron out
the details of conducting the offering (e.g. price, size, timing); and they market
it, contacting interested investors and soliciting orders from them. 4
Most IPOs involve a "firm-commitment" offering, where the underwriter
commits to buy all the shares of the offering to resell to the public.' Under
1 Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I thank the organizers and
participants of the Kentucky Law Journal 2013 Symposium, The Securities Act of1933 at 8o: Does It
Provide a Fair andEfficient Access to Capita, held at the University of Kentucky College of Law on
October I, 2013, especially organizers Rutheford B Campbell and James Cox, and participants at
University of Georgia's "First Monday" series, particularly Peter "Bo" Rutledge. Thanks also to Jay
Ritter and Dan Coenen for helpful comments. Jordan Seal and Miranda Owens provided valuable
research assistance. Special thanks to Mike Stegemoller for continued advice and counsel on this
project. Mistakes are my own.
2 See DAVID A. WESTENBERG, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO GOING
PUBLIC § 19:2 (2012) (describing underwriting basics).
3 See id. § 19:2.2[B], at 40 ("[T]he underwriters purchase the shares from the company at the
IPO price, less a discount called the "underwriting discount"or "gross spread .. . ."); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1533 (9 th ed. 2009) (defining "spread" in the investment banking context and offering
"gross spread" and "underwriting spread" as synonyms).
4 See WESTENBERG, supra note 2, § l9 :2.I[B] (explaining the roles of bank personnel in
underwriting).
5 See I THOMAS LEE HAZEN,THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 2.I[2][B] (6th ed. 2009)
(describing the basics of firm-commitment underwriting). Often underwriters will also undertake
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governing law, however, underwriters cannot enter into binding subscription
agreements with purchasers prior to the offering.6 As a result, underwriters bear
the risk that the offering will not sell.
Underwriters'official compensation for bearing that risk and for shepherding
the issuer through the IPO process comes from the gross spread-that is, the
difference between the discounted price the underwriter pays the issuer and the
"sticker price" at which the underwriter sells the offering to the public.' For the
past two and a half decades this price has clustered at a single percentage: 7%.
Indeed, despite "widely accepted" fixed underwriting costs, 90% of IPOs from
1995-1998 had spreads clustered atexactly7%.9 Chen and Ritterfirstdocumented
the puzzle of the 7% spread in 2000.1o In that paper, they hypothesized that this
7% spread was above competitive levels, the product of implicit collusion among
underwriters." Subsequent finance literature confirmed the presence of a sticky
7% spread, 12 although some observers disputed the claim that this commonality
signaled collusion.'"
The passage of the JOBS Act affords an opportunity to examine the
effect of a legal change on the costs of going public. If we assume that
Title I is operating as intended, it should now be cheaper and easier to take
issuers public. If we also assume that the underwriting market is competitive
and that pricing is flexible, one would expect to see a decline from the 7%
spread in the post-JOBS Act world.
Of course, the forgoing assumptions are big ones. Title I's provisions may
not be effective in bringing down the costs of IPOs; thus, the underwriter
spread may be unaffected. Or the provisions may be effective in bringing
down the cost of taking a firm public, but the savings may not be reflected by a
reduction in the gross spread, either as a result of collusive behavior or because
to support the offering price of the shares, at least for the first few days or weeks following the IPO.
See WESTENBERG, supra note 2, §§ 19:1, 19 .2.i[B], 19 .2.2[B], 19:3.4 (describing aftermarket price
stabilization by stabilization manager).
6 See HAZEN, supra note 5, § 2.2[2], at 220-22 (overviewing offer requirements applicable
during the "waiting period"when most road shows take place).
7 Underpricing, the chief form of unofficial underwriter compensation, is outside the scope
of this Article.
8 See HAZEN, supra note 5, § 3.2 , at 302 ("Underwriting commissions are commonly seven
percent for initial public offerings . ... ").
9 Hsuan-Chi Chen &Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 1105 (2000).
1o See id.
i Id. at no6, 29.
12 Mark Abrahamson et al., Why Don't US. Issuers Demand European Fees for IPOs, 66 J. FIN.
2055, 2o6o tbl.i (2on1).
13 Robert S. Hansen, Do Investment Banks Compete in IPOs?: The Advent of the '7% Plus
Contract", 59 J. FIN. EcoN. 313, 313 (2001); Chitru S. Fernando et al., Prestige Without Purpose?
Reputation, Differentiation, and Pricing in U.S. Equity Underwriting (Jan. 28, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2334034 (providing
evidence that "contradicts continuing suggestions of U.S. equity underwriter collusion").
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underwriter pricing is inflexible for other reasons. Finally, it might be that
Title I's provisions are effective, but the market is still in the process of
internalizing them. That is, the existing data might be too recent to reflect a
change that will ultimately occur.
With these caveats firmly in mind, this Article seeks to provide a first-cut
answer to the question ofwhether Title I has had an impact on the underwriting
spread. I isolate three separate ways in which EGCs should benefit from
relaxed rules Tide I put in place that seem to make the underwriters'job easier:
1) issuers are now allowed to file draft registration statements with the SEC;
2) they may "test the waters" by communicating with qualified institutional
buyers and accredited investors to determine their interest in an offering prior
to its launch; and 3) they are allowed to provide two, rather than three, years of
financial statements.14
I examine spreads on 125 firm-commitment IPOs from April 10, 2012
to July 27, 2013, omitting closed-end funds, American Depository Receipts
(ADRs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), unit offerings, financial
institutions, and best efforts offerings from the sample. My hypothesis is that
various JOBS Act provisions have made it cheaper, easier, and less risky to go
public. If they have, and if no collusion is present, gross spreads of EGCs should
fall below 7%.
I discuss various characteristics of my sample in Part III, but the punch
line is: There is a positive and significant relationship, at the 10% level, between
the filing of a draft registration statement and a spread under 7%. Controlling
for size (which the literature universally acknowledges to be a factor in
pricing, given economies of scale in underwriting), the relation is significant at
a 5% level.
The ultimate lessons of the findings are multivalent. On the topic of
stickiness, it is evidence that underwriter pricing is flexible, which in turn
suggests a lack of collusion, at least in the post-JOBS Act environment.
It remains to be seen whether post-JOBS spreads will find a new equilibrium
point around which to cluster.
Secondly, the data provide an opportunity to give theJOBS Act a preliminary
exam. Given the concrete effect on underwriting costs, it seems that Congress
got something right: the ability of an issuer to file draft registration statements
appears an effective means of easing the IPO process. The data do not show an
effect that results from the law's reduction of the number of years for which
financial statements must be supplied. To be sure, this fact does not necessarily
mean that this provision is ineffective at spurring IPOs. Instead, it may be that
this provision makes IPOs more attractive to issuers, but is a topic to which
underwriters are indifferent.
Thirdly, the data do show a relationship between the filing of a draft
registration statement and reduced underwriting fees. Importantly, they suggest
14 Unfortunately, due to limitations in the data, I have been unable to determine with certainty
which issuers have made use of their newfound ability to test the waters.
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that this ability to obtain a "free look" from the SEC is making EGC IPOs
cheaper and easier.
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the old system
for going public and the central role the underwriting banks play in it.'Ihis
Part also highlights the changes the JOBS Act wrought, focusing specifically
on those changes that might make the underwriter's job easier and less risky.
Part II reviews the literature surrounding the underwriter discount, describing
both the original Chen & Ritter study and subsequent work that offered
explanations apart from collusion for the sticky 7% spread. Part III presents the
data I have collected and findings they support. Most importantly, they suggest
that the Title I's introduction of the draft registration statement is a valuable
feature of the post-JOBS Act securities laws.
I. THE JOBS AcT's CHANGES TO THE IPO PROCESS
The JOBS Act has changed the IPO landscape. Title I of the JOBS Act
aimed to make going public easier for emerging growth companies, defined
as companies with total annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion (after
inflation adjustments to be made every five years by the SEC) during their most
recently completed fiscal year." Several provisions in particular seem to make
the job of the underwriter cheaper, easier, and less risky for EGCs than it was
in the past. First, EGCs may confidentially submit draft registration statements
for SEC review prior to going public.'" Second, EGCs and their underwriters
can communicate with qualified institutional buyers and accredited investors
to determine their interest in the offering ("testing the waters")."' Third,
registration statements for the IPO need only include two years of audited
financial statements (down from the three years required for non-EGCs)."
Before one can appreciate the changes the JOBS Act wrought on the
offering process, it is necessary to understand a typical IPO timeline in the
pre-JOBS Act world. Before JOBS, a company and its bank would take four
to six weeks to prepare a registration statement, including a prospectus, to file
15 Securities Act of s933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(19 ) (2052).
16 Id. § 7 7f(e)(1).
17 Id § 77 e(d).
18 Id. § 77g(a)(2) (2012). Other important JOBS Act accommodations are relevant only after
the company goes public: the exemption from the internal controls audit, streamlined executive
compensation disclosure, and extended phase-in for changes in generally accepted accounting
principles. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 7 262(b) (2012) (exempting EGCs from internal
evaluation and control requirements); JOBS Act, Pub. L. No.112-I06, § 102(a)(3), 1z6 Stat. 3o6, 309
(2012) [hereinafter JOBS Act] (exempting EGCs from compensation disclosures that could be
required by Dodd-Frank); Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2) (2012) (requiring EGCs to
adopt new accounting procedures only if and when "companies that are not issuers" are required to
do so). Because these come into play only after the IPO, I presume they would not ease the role of
the underwriter in any appreciable way, and so I ignore them for the purposes of this study.
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with the SEC.'"The registration statement described the company's business
and prospects, management's background, legal and accounting issues, financial
statements, and the details of the offering itself."'Ihe accountants, underwriters,
and counsel for both the underwriter and the issuer conducted "due diligence"
to ensure that each statement in the prospectus was accurate.2'
After filing the registration statement, the company entered a quiet period,
in which federal securities laws restricted the information the company could
release to the public.22 Once the SEC made comments on the registration
statement, the company had to wait longer still as it responded to SEC
requests and awaited word on whether further amendments to the registration
statement would be necessary. Once the company was sure that the SEC had
not identified any large obstacles to going public, it would finalize a road show,
which consisted of a number of meetings with large potential investors in a
number of cities during a two- or three-week period.24 Web presentations were
also sometimes made available to institutional investors.25 Generally the issuer
also filed an electronic version of the road show presentation with the SEC. As
the road show moved along, the underwriters built their book of subscriptions,
typically looking for four-to-five times oversubscription rates. If all went well,
at the close of the road show, the managing underwriters advised the issuer's
pricing committee about the number of shares and price at which they were
willing to purchase the shares to offer to the public.26 Ihe SEC would then
officially declare the registration statement effective, and the stock would be
sold the next day.27
In the real world public offerings rarely ran this smoothly. Problems could
emerge at any stage of the process. Some problems were out of the issuer's
hands; for example, the IPO "window" could close at any time, meaning that
market conditions had changed to make it an inhospitable climate for IPOs of
all kinds.28 'Ihe SEC could take serious issue with statements in the registration
19 See SONNY ALLISON ET AL., THE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR
ENTREPRENEURS, EXECUTIVES, DIRECTORS AND PRIVATE INVESTORS 41-42 (2008) (overviewing
the basic IPO timeline).
20 See HAZEN, supra note 5, § 3.2 (detailing process of preparing and submitting a registration
statement).
21 See id. § 3.2, at 303 ("Each of the participants in the preparation of the registration statement
has a duty of reasonable investigation.").
22 See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 19, at 34 (introducing the "waiting period" portion of an
IPO timeline).
23 See id. (describing receipt of and response to SEC "comment letters").
24 See id. at 63 (generalizing steps in conducting a road show).
25 See id.
26 See id. at 35, 41-42 (explaining steps between the road show and an effective offering).
27 See id. at 35, 41.
28 See WESTENBERG, Supra note 2, §§ 1:3, 1:3.1 (describing the "window" and listing factors
affecting IPO timing).
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statement, or require further information.29 In the process of due diligence,
the accountants could discover weaknesses or inaccuracies in the financial
statements, and the lawyers could uncover legal issues that need to be resolved.30
During the road show, the underwriters might determine that potential buyers
were cool to the issuer's "story" and abandon the offering altogether." The
SEC's Edgar database is littered with registration statements from companies
that failed to go public; indeed, many companies that eventually did go public
had a failed registration statement along the way.32
By statutory design the underwriter bears a large measure of these risks.
Firm commitment underwriters address this risk by building a "book" of
subscriptions, often oversubscribing the actual offering amount." Thus, the
underwriter's work benefits both the issuer and potential investors. For the
issuer, the underwriter makes a market. For buyers, underwriters provide
an investment opportunity while contributing to due-diligence work that
maximizes the information potential buyers receive.'
Pricing an initial offering is a risky business, since there is by definition
no pre-existing market price to use as a reference point. In addition, these
transactions are fraught with informational asymmetries; issuers know more
about their future outlook than do potential investors, and investors know more
about the terms on which they will invest.3s As repeat players, investment banks
can act as informational intermediaries or, as William Wilhelm terms them,
"coordinators of large-scale, strategic information networks."36
Moreover, underwriters serve a bonding function because of the legal
obligations they assume in the offering process. Underwriters are strictly
29 See id. §§ 17:3.3,3.5 (listing types of SEC comments to registration statement submissions).
30 See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 5, § 3.2 (providing examples of legal challenges that may arise
in preparing a registration statement).
31 E.g., Miriam Hill, 7he IPO Road Show Companies Undergo Scrutiny Before They Go Public,
PHILLY.coM (Aug. 31, 2ooo), http://articles.philly.com/2ooo-8-3i/business/2559288 7 _i-money-
managers-ipo-process-road-show (reporting the importance of a roadshow's "story" to investors).
32 See, e.g., Netflix.com, Inc., Request for Withdrawal of Registration Statement on Form
S-i (Registration Withdraw) (July 21, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/io65280/OOOIOI287ooooo3893/oooso287o-oo-0o3893-oool.txt (requesting withdrawal of
Netflix's first registration filing).
33 See Darcy Travios, Facebook: How (NOT) to Price and Trade an IPO. Thoughts from a
Capital Markets Veteran, FORBES.COM (May 20, 2012, 9:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
darcytravlos/2oz2/5/2o/facebook-how-not-to-price-and-trade-and-ipo-thoughts-from-a-
capital-markets-veteran/; see also WESTENBERG, supra note 2, § 19:3-3 (outlining strategies
for selling an entire offering, usually by building a cushion on excess demand into the book to
boost aftermarket interest); Bhagwan Chowdhry & Ann Sherman, International Diferences in
Oversubscription and Underpricing ofIPOs, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 359,360-62 (1996) (overviewing levels of
oversubscription internationally).
34 See WESTENBERG, supra note 2, § Ig: 7.2[BJ (listing examples of diligence).
35 William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Bookbuilding, Auctions, and the Future of the IPO Process, 17 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55,57 (2005).
3 6 Id.
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liable for any misstatements in the registration statement," but they have a
due diligence defense: they are not liable if, after reasonable investigation, they
have an actual belief based on reasonable grounds that the statements were true
and not misleading." Thus purchasers can take comfort in knowing that the
underwriter has vetted the registration statement for accuracy and is a "deep
pocket" on the hook for misstatements in many cases. 9
Having reviewed the pre-JOBS Act IPO process, and the underwriting
bank's central role in it, we can return to Title I's accommodations with a
greater appreciation for how they changed the public offering process.
First, emerging growth companies'post-JOBS Act ability to communicate
confidentially with the SEC prior to filing should make it easier to go public
and ease the underwriting process as well.40 If the SEC has serious reservations
about the issuer's early disclosures, the underwriter can learn about those
reservations and address them before embarking on the offering.4' Alternatively,
the underwriter can decide that the issuer is not a good candidate for
underwriting at all, thus saving the expense of further drafting, due diligence,
and a road show for an offering destined to falter or fail.42 To the extent that
the 7% discount includes an extra allowance to account for the possibility of
37 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (2o2); see also Joseph K. Leahy, The
Irrepressible Myths ofBarChris,37 DEL.J. CORP. L. 411,421-22 (2012) (describing underwriter liability
for statements in the registration statement). See infra notes and accompanying text (providing a
more detailed discussion of underwriter liability for statements in the registration statement).
38 The 1933 Act states that "no person, other than the issuer, shall be liable" unless the issuer
can prove that "after reasonable investigation," he had an actual belief based on reasonable grounds
that the statements in the registration statement were true and not misleading when the registration
statement became effective. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)( 3 )(A). See also infra notes 54-58 and accompanying
text (discussing affirmative defenses available to underwriters).
39 See Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7 6o6A, Exchange
Act Release No. 4 o,63 2A, Investment Company Act NO. 23519A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174-ox, 67,230
(proposed Dec. 4, 1998) (stating that "Congress deliberately placed underwriters within the scope
of [the 1933 Act's] liability provisions" to help ensure that investors receive "complete and truthful
information regarding the offered securities.").
40 See Telis Demos, Twitter Airs a JOBS Act Dispute: Keep It Secret or Not?, WALL ST. J.
MONEYBEAT (Sept. 13, 2013, 5:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2o3/o9/i3/twitter-
airs-a-jobs-act-dispute-keep-it-secret-or-not/ (collecting investor and industry perspectives on
the strategic benefits of confidential filing).
41 Christine Lagorio-Chafkin, How 'Confidential' IPOs Are Changing the Market, INC.,
http://www.inc.com/christine-lagorio/public-offerings-how-confidential-ipos-are-changing-
the-market.html/ (last updated Sept. 12, 2012) (identifying "back-and-forths with the SEC" as a
primary benefit of confidential filing).
42 See How "Confidential" is a Confidential Draft SEC Registration Statement Submitted Under
theJOBSAct?, KILPATRICK ToWNSEND (June 22, 2012, 4:39 PM), http://blogs.kilpatricktownsend.
com/SecuritiesLaw/?p=i19 (describing benefits of confidential filing for firms that decide not to
go public); Kenneth I. Moch, Why the JOBS Act Is a Lifesaver for Life Sciences Companies, FORBES
(July 19, 2013, 7:oo AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/o7/19/why-the-jobs-
act-is-a-lifesaver-for-life-sciences-companies/ (describing cost savings of confidential filings in
the context of life science companies via protection of confidential business information).
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ultimate failure, 43 underwriters can reduce this allowance in a post-JOBS Act
world. The comfort that SEC review provides should result in fewer ultimately
aborted offerings progressing farther than they ought to. Road shows are
expensive; to reach an ideal level of subscriptions, the underwriter and issuer
devote considerable resources, including human capital, toward reaching and
enticing investors." Thus, if confidential filings help underwriters diagnose
problems early then they can help underwriters pull doomed offerings before
road show and other sales expenses are incurred.45 Moreover, if many of these
underwriting costs decline, there is less need for underwriters to cover the cost
of failed offerings, so that we should expect the ultimate underwriting discount
to decrease accordingly. In short, in a competitive market we would expect to
see a reduction in gross spreads.
The JOBS Act's "testing the waters" provision should reduce gross spreads
as well. A chief task of the underwriter is to sell the offering.46 Limited by
the restriction on obtaining firm subscription agreements,47 underwriters must
inevitably guess at the market price for new issues;48 usually the result is that
offerings are oversubscribed to avoid the "Facebook" problem of offering too
many shares at too high a price for the market.49 A fear of overpricing results
in the opposite, and much more common, problem of underpricing shares.so
In the pre-JOBS Act world, firms were not allowed to sell securities before
the registration statement became effective, and were limited in engaging in
post-filing communications with customers as well.s'
43 See Morris Mendelson, Underwriting Compensation, in Friend, Longstreet, Mendelson,
Miller and Hess,INVESTMENT BANKING AND THE NEW ISSUES MARKET 394,398 (1967) (describing
the risk that "after much work has been done [by the underwriter] in the preparation of an issue, a
prospective issuer may decide against issuing the security under consideration because of adverse
changes in the market or some other development" as one of the more common "occupational
hazards" affecting underwriters' general overhead costs).
44 See STEPHEN C. BLOWERS ET AL.,THE ERNST & YOUNG GUIDE TO TAKING YOUR COMPANY
PUBLIc 91 (1995) (highlighting the "considerable expense" associated with road shows, especially in
terms of "the heavy commitment of executive time required for an initial public offering").
45 See Lagorio-Chafkin, supra note 41 ("[Confidential filing] makes it easier for a company to
quietly back away from an IPO if the [SEC's] response isn't sunny.").
46 SeeWESTENBERG,supra note 2, § i9:2 ("In a firm-commitment underwriting, the company
sells shares to the underwriters, which then distribute the shares to the public .... ").
47 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012) (prohibiting sale of securities before a
registration statement has become effective).
48 See ALLISON ET AL, supra note 19, at 8.
49 See Travlos, supra note 33 (criticizing Facebook's offering for its inflated IPO price and its
related failure to adequately subscribe to the offering).
50 See Steven M. Davidoff, Why IPO. 's Get Underpriced, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 27,
2011, 10:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/on/o5/27/why-i-p-o-s-get-underpriced/ (listing
"average underpricing" statistics for U.S. offerings).
51 See Robert Evans, 7he US. JOBS Act and Non-U S. Companies: Changes to the Ofering
Process and Compliance Challenges, FINANCIAL REGULATORY FORUM (May 8, 2012), http://blogs.
reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/o/o8/the-u-s-jobs-act-and-non-u-s-companies-
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The JOBS Act allows firms to test the waters by communicating
with accredited investors and qualified institutional buyers prior to the
road show-prior even to filing with the SEC-about their potential interest in
the offering.52 As with the confidential SEC filing, this newfound ability for the
underwriter to gauge investor demand before embarking on the costly offering
process should cut down on fruitless due diligence and abortive road shows,
thus reducing overall costs to the underwriter." In a competitive environment,
this reduction should translate into a lower spread for completed offerings. 54
Finally, reducing the number of audited financial statements that the issuer
must file to two years'worth from three might simplify the underwriters'work.
Under the Securities Act, underwriters are liable for material misstatements or
omissions contained in the registration statement,5 5 unless one oftwo affirmative
defenses apply.56 The availability of each defense depends primarily on whether
the inaccurate information was "made on the authority of an expert."" Although
the Act does not define an "expert," courts have held that accountants qualify,
and that underwriters can rely on information prepared by them without fear
of liability.58 However, this protection only extends to information to which
an expert has actually applied his or her expertise. For example, courts and
the SEC have distinguished between audited annual financial statements
incorporated in registration statements and "comfort letters" issued as part
changes-to-the-offering-process-and-compliance-challenges/ (contrasting pre-JOBS limits on
communications with the new test-the-waters allowance).
52 § 7 7e(d) ("[An emerging growth company or any person authorized to act on [its] behalf
... may engage in oral or written communications with potential investors that are qualified
institutional buyers or institutions that are accredited investors ... to determine whether such
investors might have an interest in a contemplated securities offering, either prior to or following
the date of filing of a registration statement .... ").
53 See Moch, supra note 42 (connecting heightened investor attention and ultimate
oversubscription to the ability to test the waters before conducting a formal road show); see also
KATRINA ELLIS ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING PROCESS 3 (1999), available
at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=io.I.-.198.5840&rep=repi&type=pdf
(associating zo% of the gross spread with underwriting expenses, such as legal costs and conducting
the road show).
54 But see Jessica Holzer, SEC Official: Confidential Filings Popular After JOBS Act, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 22, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/zOI3/02/22/sec-official-confidential-filings-
popular-after-jobs-act/ ("[T]he SEC is hearing anecdotal reports that relaxed restrictions on the
use of IPO research isn't being broadly adopted. Meanwhile, few companies are taking advantage
of the right to hold discussions with investors ... to gauge their interest .... ").
55 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 k(a)(5) (2012); see also Leahy, supra note 37, at 421-22
(describing underwriter liability for statements in the registration statement).
56 See § 7 7k(b)(3); see also Leahy, supra note 37, at 422.
57 §§ 77k(b)(3)(A)-(C).
58 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing In re
Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 5o F 3d 615, 623 (9 th Cir. 1994); In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Regulation of Securities
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 76o6A, Exchange Act Release No. 40,63 2A, Investment
Company Act No. 23 519A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174-os, 67,233 (proposed Dec. 4, 1998).
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of the due diligence process: the only portions of a registration statement
that may be safely relied upon are those actually prepared or certified by an
accountants"l hus, underwriters can rely on certified annual financials attached
to a registration statement, but must conduct a reasonable investigation into
other forms of information-such as interim financials or management
projections-to be insulated from liability. To the extent that issuer filings cover
only two (rather than three) years, it, therefore, may follow that underwriter
reviews of issuer registration statements will become less complicated and
costly.
Anecdotal reports suggest, however, that issuers may not be availing
themselves of the opportunity that the JOBS Act affords them to disclose
only two, rather than three, years of audited financial statements.o In any
event, the need to deal with two years of financial statements probably reduces
underwriters' exposure only marginally, if at all. Indeed, if issuers supplement
their two years of audited financial statements with the disclosure of other
financial information, such as unaudited, and thus non-expertized statements,
the effect will be to increase underwriter liability by providing them with more
material for which they must conduct due diligence. Thus one area of interest
is the type and amount of financial information issuers are disclosing under
current law.
Having reviewed both the evidence on clustering of U.S. gross spreads at
7% and the changes that the JOBS Act has wrought on the IPO process, we
are ready to tackle the central question of the Article: what impact, if any, the
JOBS Act has had on gross spreads.
II. PRIOR LITERATURE
At the outset, it is important to note that the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority ("FINRA") regulates underwriter compensation.61 FINRA applies
a secret formula to determine whether the proposed compensation is 'fair and
reasonable'; if it is not, the offering may not go forward.6 2 FINRA, however, is
concerned with setting an upper ceiling on the spread, and generally accepts a
59 See In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F 3d 615, 623 (9 th Cir. 1994) ("An
underwriter need not conduct due diligence into the 'expertised' parts of a prospectus, such as
certified financial statements."); In re WorldCom,3 4 6 F. Supp. 2d at 666 (contrasting certified annual
financial statements with interim financial information).
6o See, e.g., Holzer, supra note 54 (reporting an SEC official's impression that companies are
not taking full advantage of the law's looser financial reporting standards); Emily Chasan, Meet
the JOBS Act' Job-Free Companies, WALL. ST. J. (June 4, 2012, 7:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SBoooI4.240527023035064045 7744398o893828956.htnil (reporting an EGC's decision not to
"relax its disclosure or compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley" without better knowledge of investor
preferences for more financial information).
61 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Untold Story of Underwriting Compensation Regulation, 44
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 625, 627 (20zo).
6 2 Id.
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spread of7%.63 Chen and Ritter first identified this clustering in their ingeniously
titled "The Seven Percent Solution,"which examined IPOs from 1985-1998.64
They raised the question whether the 7% spread was artificially high, and
whether it was the product of implicit collusion or a lack of competition in
pricing.65
Abrahamson, Jenkinson, and Jones updated the Chen and Ritter study in
2010 and found even greater convergence around 7% between 1998 and 2007. 6
Like Chen and Ritter, they also highlighted the existence of lower European
IPO fees, which did not cluster around any number.67 However, Torstila found
evidence of clustering in foreign markets, including some clustering more
pronounced than in the U.S. 6 Torstila also cited the existence of clustering
coupled with a low gross spread as evidence that clustering does not necessarily
imply collusion. He suggested, nevertheless, that the existence of large
U.S. IPOs with a 7% gross spread qualified as "suspect."69
There are a variety of explanations for price inelasticity in gross spreads.
Robert S. Hansen proposed an efficient contract theory for the dominant
7% figure." Hansen emphasized that the IPO contract has many facets; for
example, underpricing of the offering could lead to higher compensation
despite a nominal price of 7%. He suggests that "7% plus" might be a more
accurate description of the contract.'
More recently, Fernando et al. found evidence of price differentiation based
on underwriter reputation.72 They concluded that higher reputation banks
receive significantly higher spreads than those with lower reputations.73
To summarize, pre-2012, several studies found significant clustering of the
underwriter discount around 7%.' Several factors suggest that this clustering
might be the product of anti-competitive forces; the bare fact of clustering
itself, and the presence of lower fees and a lack of clustering for European
IPOs. Hansen proposes an alternate explanation for clustering, postulating that
other levers of underwriter compensation may adjust in a competitive manner
63 Chen & Ritter, supra note 9.
64 See id.
65 See id. at nio6 (offering "several possible explanations" for the cluster of spreads at 7%).
66 Abrahamson et al.,supra note 12, at 2056.
67 Id. at 2057.
68 See Sami Torstila, The Clustering ofIPO Gross Spreads: International Evidence, 38 J. FIN. &
QUANT. ANALYSIS 673, 674 (2003) (observing that 95% of Hong Kong IPOs, 86% of Indian IPOs,
56% Singaporean IPOs have a gross spread of 2.5%).
69 See id at 674, 691.
70 Hansen, supra note 13.
71 Id. at 315-
72 Fernando et al., supra note 13, at I.
73 Id. at 4-5.
74 See id at 2 (introducing the influence ofunderwriter reputation on gross spreads).
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despite the near-constant 7% fee.7 ' Fernando et al. offer some evidence that the
clustering masks price differentiation based on bank reputation.76
III. DATA
Chen and Ritter originally examined the spreads on firm commitment
IPOs from January 1985 to January 1998 covered. in the Securities Data
Company's (SDC) New Issues database.7 7 They eliminated closed-end funds,
ADRs, REITs, and unit offerings from the sample.78 They further restricted the
sample to equity IPOs with domestic gross proceeds of over $20 million because
the spreads for small offerings are "much higher due to the diseconomies of
scale."79 Chen and Ritter excluded overallotment options, and expressed all
dollars in terms of 1997 purchasing power." As described above, Chen and
Ritter found evidence of the clustering of spreads around 7%.1
Abrahamson, Jenkinson, and Jones revisited Chen and Ritter's study after
ten years, and also compared U.S. underwriting spreads with European ones,
applying the same exclusions and using a cutoff of $25 million, the 2007
equivalent of $20 million in 1997.82 They discovered that clustering at 7% had
become even more prevalent since 1998." They further found new evidence
of clustering in larger IPOs, reporting that 77% of offerings sized between
$100 and $250 million clustered at exactly 7%.'
Seeking to take the same approach as these earlier studies, I ran a search
in SDC of all firm-commitment IPOs over $29 million (the 2012 equivalent
to $20 million in 1997 dollars) from April 5, 2012 (the JOBS Act enactment
date) through July 27, 2013. I excluded all unit issuers, REITs, closed-end
funds, and ADRs. I required that the primary exchange be in the United States.
As is customary in the literature, I excluded banks, savings and loans, and asset
management companies with an SIC code beginning with six.
My hypothesis is that various JOBS Act provisions make it cheaper, easier,
and less risky to go public. That was the intent of the statute. Therefore, if
no collusion is present, gross spreads of EGCs should fall below 7%. If the
underwriting spread holds constant at 7%, this indicates that collusion persists
in the face of lower underwriting costs. There may have been some initial
uncertainty associated with the transition to post-JOBS Act underwriting, so
75 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
77 See Chen & Ritter, supra note 9, at n1o7.
78 Id. at io7-o8.
79 Id at iro8.
8o Id
81 Id. at Iro8-og.
82 Abrahamson et al., supra note 12, at 2058.
83 Id. at 2o56.
84 Id. at 2057.
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an alternate hypothesis is that the underwriting spreads immediately after the
Act hold constant, and then drift down over time as savings materialize and
banks begin to compete on spreads. In other words, a limitation of these data is
their recency. We may see more change as more time passes.
Alternatively, a steady 7% might indicate that the JOBS Act provisions
were ineffective. On balance, however, this result seems unlikely.'Ihe provisions,
particularly testing the waters and allowing for a "free look" from the SEC
via draft registration statement, seem likely to have succeeded in their goal of
making the IPO process cheaper and easier."
Finally, Hansen's work suggests that there might be other reasons for
clustering: 1) deviations from the norm might raise suspicions about issuer
value (underwriters might be willing to overvalue a firm in exchange for a
generous spread); 2) uniform spreads might reduce moral hazard by encouraging
underwriter placement effort; or 3) a fixed figure might lower negotiation
costs, particularly because the spread is negotiated together with other offering
details, such as the offering amount, the overallotment, and the offer price. 6
To maintain the constant gross spread, other portions of the underwriter's
compensation, namely underpricing, may flex in a more competitive manner.
Were this theory true, we would expect to see less underpricing in EGCs in the
face of a constant gross spread.
If underwriting spreads drop, but cluster around some lower percentage, the
drop is evidence that the JOBS Act has driven down costs. But the clustering
might indicate that collusion is occurring once more and that the market has
converged on a lower spread as the appropriate one. Finally, if underwriting
spreads drop but do not cluster, there is evidence the JOBS Act drove down
the costs of going public and collusion may not exist, perhaps because of the
shake-up of industry practice brought about by the Act.
One challenge of researching the effect of these provisions is that issuers
appear to be employing a "cafeteria style" approach to the EGC provisions: they
pick and choose which of the accommodations they will use.17 For example, a
company might qualify as an EGC company, yet voluntarily disclose three years
of financials rather than the permitted two. Or it may avail itself of its new
"test the waters" ability, but elect not to provide confidential draft registration
statements for SEC review. This heterogeneity in EGCs requires the tracking
of different variables in the sample. Another hypothesis of this Article is that
EGCs making use of more accommodations will have a lower spread than
those that make use of fewer accommodations.
85 But see 2ol3 BDO IPO Outlook, BDO 5, http://www.bdo.com/download/2 4 32 (last visited
Mar. 31, 204) (observing that only 29% of capital markets executives at leading investment banks
thought the JOBS Act would be effective at increasing IPOs, while 28% thought it was too early
to tell).
86 See Hansen, supra note 13, at 315-16.
87 See Holzer, supra note 54 ("[An SEC official] indicated that some of the law's provisions are
proving more popular than others.").
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Accordingly, in the sample I separate EGC-filing companies from those
that do not opt to file as EGCs. Not every issuer that qualifies elects to file as
an EGC. Companies identify themselves as EGCs on the cover page of the
registration statement, so identification is easy."8 With regard to EGC filers,
I track which companies disclose more than two years of financials. Again, a
simple review of the registration statement reveals this information.
Tracking which issuers avail themselves of confidential review ofregistration
statements prior to filing is a little more complicated. From the passage of the
JOBS Act, the SEC required companies that elect to go forward with an offering
after a confidential review to file the draft registration statement publicly.89'he
current practice is for the issuer to file the draft registration statement as a
"DRS."9 o Accordingly, where such a tag occurs in the SEC's Edgar database, it is
clear that the company availed itself of the confidential review accommodation.
Initially however, the SEC required issuers to attach the draft registration
statement as an exhibit to the first filed registration statement, generally as
exhibit 99.1 or 99.2.91 Therefore, where there is no DRS designated filing, I
review the first S-1 filed to see if a draft registration statement is attached as
an exhibit. Using this method, I am reasonably confident that I am capturing
most instances in which the issuer submitted a draft registration statement for
review.
Unfortunately, I have no such faith with respect to the "test the waters"
provision. If in correspondence the staff asks an issuer whether it has
communicated with any qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) or accredited
investors, and the issuer responds affirmatively, I am able to count such instances
of use of the provision. Indeed, there have been reports that the SEC "routinely"
asks for copies of written test-the-waters materials. One law firm advises
only providing these materials in hard copy (rather than through EDGAR),
requesting confidential treatment, and asking the SEC staff to return the
materials.92 Thus, there is no way to be certain I am capturing all, or even most,
88 See jumpstart Our Business Startups Act: Frequently Asked Questions - Generally Applicable
Questions on Title I on the JOBS Act, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (last updated Sept, 28, 2012), http:/
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfjobsactfaq-title-i-general.htm ("[An] issuer should
disclose that it is an emerging growth company on the cover page of its prospectus.").
89 See Securities Act of 1933, 5 U.S.C. § 77f(e)(i) (2o02) (requiring that the "initial confidential
submission and all amendments thereto shall be publicly filed with the Commission not later than
21 days before the date on which the issuer conducts a road show").
go See How to Use EDGAR to Submit Draft Registration Statements andAmendments and File
Them in Accordance with the Requirements oftheJOBS Act, SEC. & Excn. COMm'N 9 (Sept. 26, zoIZ),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/drsfilingprocedures.pdf (advising issuers on
submission of"DRS" materials on the SEC's online database).
91 See TOWNSEND, supra note 42 ("These prior confidential submissions should be included as
exhibits to the company's later publicly filed registration statement, if any.").
92 Although the SEC does not require test-the-waters materials be submitted independently,
in practice, the Staff often requests that "written materials" used for test-the-waters be submitted
for review with the registration statement. See Corporate Finance Alert: The JOBS Act: What We
Learned in the First Nine Months, SKADDEN, ARPs, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES
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such uses.13 Indeed, I found only four such instances, which I report here but do
not include in the reported data.
Finally, Title I of the JOBS Act provides other benefits to EGCs, including
exemptions from onerous executive compensation disclosure requirements and
internal controls review.9 4 While these provisions arguably make being public
more attractive for a private company, they do not make the process of going
public any easier.'Ihus I omit them from this study.
In sum, I examine spreads on 125 firm commitment IPOs from
April 5, 2012 (Title I's effective date) to July 27, 2013. Closed-end funds,
ADRS, REITs, unit offerings, financial institutions, and best efforts offerings
are excluded from the sample. Finally, I exclude the Facebook IPO. Facebook
went public within the period, but it was an outlier in many ways. Its offering
size of $16 billion was almost eight times the size of the next largest offering,
and its spread was commensurately tiny, only 1.10%.15 I exclude it lest it skew
the results unduly.
Table 1 reports the number of offerings by issuer type (EGC or non-EGC),
offering size, and gross spread. As a reminder, looking at the 1998-2007 period,
Abrahamson, Jenkins, and Jones describe an average gross spread of 6.98%,
with 95.4% of moderate IPOs and 77% of IPOs sized between $100 and
$250 million reporting exactly 7%,'6 an increase in the clustering that Chen and
Ritter first reported.
The post-JOBS Act data show that clustering at the 7% level continues
unabated. Table 1 shows that overall, moderate-size IPOs (with proceeds
between $29 and $109.99 million) exhibit substantial clustering: 94.2%
(compared to 95.4% in the 1998-2007 period). In larger IPOs (with proceeds
between $110 and $277 million, the 2012 equivalent of Abrahamson's next
grouping) there is less clustering, with 66.7% of the sample exhibiting a spread
of exactly 7%, and the remaining 33.7% employing a spread averaging 6.33%.
This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom that economies of
scale should operate on larger offerings, and the gross spread should decrease.
Chen and Ritter's study indeed found such economies of scale, but they were
less evident in the Abrahamson study.17
14 (Jan. 2013), http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publicationsflheJOBSActWhat_
WeLearned_in theFirstNineMonths.pdf (advising that issuers expect a "standard comment
from the Staff requesting that any 'written materials' used in connection with testing-the-waters
communications be provided supplementally to the Staff in connection with its review of the
registration statement"(quoting Paula Dubberly, Div. of Corp. Fin. Deputy Dir., Policy and Capital
Markets, Remarks at PLI Securities Regulation Institute (Nov. 7, 2012))).
93 Author's discussion with the SEC Division of Corporation Finance confirms the same.
94 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 1z-io6, tit. 1, 126 Stat. 306,307-I3 (2012).
95 See Evelyn M. Rusli and Peter Eavis, Facebook Raises sr6 Billion in IPO., N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (May 17, 2012, 4:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2O12/05/17/facebook-raises-16-
billion-in-i-p-o/.
96 Abrahamson et al., supra note 12, at 2o6 2-6 4.
97 Chen & Ritter, supra note 9, at III4; Abrahamson et al., supra note 12, at 2064.
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Delving further into the data, I compare EGCs and non-EGCs. Table 1
shows that the IPOs for moderate-size EGCs demonstrate a significant amount
of clustering at the 7% spread: 95.4% of the EGC IPOs had underwriter
discounts of exactly 70/-the very number Abrahamson, Jenkins, and Jones
found in their study. The clustering is less pronounced at large IPOs, with only
76% of EGC IPOs in this category exhibiting gross spreads of exactly 7%, but
again, this number closely tracks Abrahamson's finding of 77% clustering at
this offering range."
The three moderate EGCs with sub-7% gross spreads appear to be outliers,
making up only 4.6% of the sample; two of the three merit further explanation.
SolarCity started out with an offering price range of $13 to $15 before being
cut to an offer price of 8.9 Initially, it was expected to raise $141 million
gross, but with the change in the offer price the ultimate offering proceeds were
expected to raise only $92 million."oo WCI Communities, Inc. filed with an
initial price range of $21 to $23 before being cut back to $15, and went from
expected gross proceeds of $185 million to $102.3 million.' 0 Thus, two of the
three sub-7% moderate-size EGCs started as larger offerings (at which point
the gross spread may have already been negotiated) before being cut back in
size to the moderate category.
The data relating to non-EGCs are striking, but the numbers are too small
to permit us to extrapolate much. First, it is clear that most moderate-size
offerings are opting for EGC status. Of the sixty-nine moderate-size issuers,
only four plumped for non-EGC treatment-and one of those, Erickson
Air-Crane, went public on April 10, 2012, the first IPO following the JOBS
Act's passage. Presumably the die was already cast in favor of a traditional IPO
at that point. The vast majority (94.2%) of moderate-size IPOs are now EGCs.
Table 2 describes the prevalence of various JOBS Act accommodations
in the EGC portion of the sample, composed of ninety-four firms.
The data show that 58.5% of all EGC IPOs make use of the draft registration
statement accommodation. The ability to disclose two, rather than three, years
of financials has proven less popular, with only 28.7% of firms making use of
that accommodation. Smaller offerings appear to be more likely to disclose
98 Abrahamson et al., supra note 12, at 2064.
99 Compare SolarCity Co., Registration Statement under Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-diA)
2 (Nov.12, 2012) ("It is currently estimated that the initial public offering price per share will be
between si3.oo and S15.00."), with SolarCity Co., Registration Statement under Securities Act of
1933 (Form S-i/A) 3 (Dec. 12, 2012) ("It is currently expected that the initial public offering price
will be s8.oo per share.").
500 SolarCity Co., Registration Statement under Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-d/A) 3
(Dec. 12, 2012).
sos Compare WCI Communities, Registration Statement under Securities Act of 1933 (Form
S-i/A) 3 (July 15, 2013) ("We currently expect the initial public offering price to be between s21.00
and $23.00 per share of our common stock."), with WCI Communities, Inc., Registration Statement
under Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-d/A) 3 (July 24, 2013) ("We currently expect the initial public
offering price to be between sx5.oo and sr7.oo per share of our common stock.").
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a reduced number of financial statements: while 32.3% of moderate-size
offerings do so, only 24.0% of larger offerings, and none of the largest ones, do.
Perhaps most intriguingly, fully 35% of the EGCs used no accommodation
that I could track; they disclosed three or more years of financials and did not
file a draft registration statement. It may be that they are making use of other
JOBS Act accommodations, such as the ability to test the waters or the ability
to have pre-IPO analyst coverage, but that information is unavailable. There,
are of course, other benefits to being an EGC after going public, such as a
reprieve from some reporting obligations.' 02 'Ihese attractions could also explain
the incidence of EGCs that make use of no accommodations at all.
Table 3 focuses on the effect of various accommodations on the gross
spread, and thus also represents only emerging growth companies. If the
accommodations are effective, the hypothesis is that the more accommodations
an issuer seeks in the IPO, the safer, cheaper, and easier the underwriting
proposition becomes, and accordingly the lower the spread will be. The data
bear out this prediction with respect to draft registration statements, but not
financial statements.
For moderate-size IPOs, issuers that make use of a confidential draft
registration statement exhibit less clustering at the 7% level. All of the
moderate-size EGCs that do not file a draft registration statement have
spreads of 7%, compared with 92.1% of those that do file a draft statement
For larger IPOs this trend is more marked: while 91% of the large EGC IPOs
that do not make use of the draft registration statement accommodation have
a gross spread of 7%, only 64.3% of those firms that do file a draft registration
statement hew to the 7% gross spread. Overall, 95% of firms that do not file a
draft registration statement have a gross spread of exactly 7%, as compared to
only 80% of those that make use of the accommodation. Thus the presence of a
draft registration statement seems to make it more likely that the gross spread
will be below 7%, albeit not much more likely.
Table 3 tells a different story when it comes to the financial statements
accommodation. Taking first the moderate-size EGCs, those that disclose
only two years of financials show less clustering than those with three years
of financials, but not much less: 90.5% versus 97.7%. In contrast, larger IPOs
making use of the financial statement accommodation results in more clustering
than not doing so: 100% of large EGC issuers disclosing two years of financials
exhibit a 7% spread, whereas only 68.4% of large EGC issuers disclosing three
years of financials do so. Admittedly, the numbers in this category are small,
making it hard to conclude much from the data. Overall, 92.6% of issuers
making use of the financials accommodation cluster at 7%, whereas only 83.6%
of issuers that do not make use of it cluster at that level.
Finally, I compare issuers who make full use of the accommodations-that
is, issuers that file a confidential draft registration statement and disclose only
102 See supra note A8.
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two years of financials, to issuers who make use of no accommodation. With
respect to moderate IPOs, issuers that make full use of the accommodations
exhibit less clustering than those that do not-88.2% compared with 100%,
respectively. However, with larger IPOs the situation is reversed; issuers that
make full use of the accommodations exhibit more clustering at 7% than
those that do not. Indeed, 100% of large IPOs where the issuer uses both
accommodations come in at exactly 7%, whereas 88.9% of those issuers with no
accommodations clustered at 7%. However, this sample size is extremely small.
Table 4 presents the results from logistic regressions in which the dependent
variable is equal to 1 if the spread is 7%, and 0 if it is below 7%. Each of the first
three models examine a particular independent variable and the last column
reports the result of combining all of the independent variables into one model.
Model 1 analyzes the effect of IPO proceeds on the underwriter discount and
finds, as expected and as other studies have shown, a significant and negative
relationship between the size of the offering and the discount rate. In general,
the larger the proceeds raised, the lower the spread is likely to be.
Model 2 examines the effect of the use of a draft registration statement
on the discount rate.'Ihe variable DRS is equal to one if the firm uses a draft
registration statement and is zero otherwise. The coefficient on this variable
is negative and significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that the use of a draft registration statement accommodation
reduces the risk the underwriter faces, thus reducing the spread below 7%.
Model 3 examines the effect of the disclosure of two rather than three years
of financial data.'Ihe independent variable is equal to one if the firm files less
than three years of financials in the registration. While the hypothesis predicted
that the ability to disclose fewer financials would reduce the risk of liability to
the underwriter, and thus lessen the cost of underwriting, the results provide
no evidence consistent with this hypothesis. The number of years of financials
disclosed has no effect on the spread.
Model 4 combines all of the variables in the previous models. Ihis model
not only retains the sign and significance of the coefficients on both the amount
of IPO proceeds and the presence of a draft registration statement on the
underwriting spread, but both the significance and magnitude of the coefficient
on DRS increase. Thus,. after controlling for size, the negative relationship
between DRS and the spread increases in size and significance.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, at least one provision of the JOBS Act seems to have
been effective at reducing underwriter costs and, accordingly, underwriter
fees. The ability to file a draft registration statement appears to make the
underwriting task easier or less risky-and therefore cheaper. The ability to
disclose only two years of financials had no such effect. Furthermore, while
flexibility in underwriting pricing casts some doubt on the collusion story, it
may be that spreads will coalesce around another (perhaps lower) point as the
post-JOBS Act underwriting market establishes a new equilibrium. This
Article's sample encompasses only the first sixteen months following the Act's
passage. Subsequent research will cast further light on the long-term effect of
the JOBS Act on underwriting spreads and on the process of going public.
Table 1-Gross Spread of EGC and Non-EGCs, 4/10/12 - 7/24/13
PanelAt Panal B: Panel C:
$29 to $109.99 million proceeds Sl10 to $277 allotn pr6eeds (locludlog > $277 mllion)
Gross Spread Gross Spread Gross Spread
Relow
7%
Above
7% Anl
Soelow
7%
Mean
Spread All
4.6% 13.8%
EGCs (3) 95.4% 0% 94.2% 24% 76% 0% 25 (13) 86.2% 6.9 94Mean: (62) (0) (65) (6) (19) (0) Mean: (81)
6.7 6.26
25% 809% 86.7%
Non- (1) 75% 0% 5.8% (4) 20% 0% 5 (26) 113.3% 5.75 30EGCs Mean: (3) (0) (4) Mean: (1) (0) Mean: (4)
6.5 6.24 5.39
5.8% 33.3% 31.5%
All (4) 94.2% 0% 100% (10) 66.7% 0% 30 (39) 68.5% 6.62 124Mean: (65) (0) (69) Mean: (20) (0) Mean: (85)
6.65 6.33 5.67
943
Above
1e%4
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Table 2-Incidence ofAccommodation, 4/10/12-7/24/13
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Table 3-Gross Spread of EGCs by Accommodation, 4/10/12-7/24/13
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
$29 to $109.99 $110 to $277 All EGC IPOs
Million proceeds Million proceeds (Including >$277 Million)
Gross Spread Gross Spread Gross Spread
Below 7% Above All7% 1 17% 1
Below
7%
Above
7% % / All
Below
7% 7% 
Mean
Spread All
7.9% 35.7% 20.0%
DRS (3) 92.1% 0 38 (5) 64.3% 0 4 (ll) 80% 6.85 55Mean (35) Mean (9) Mean: (44)
6.70 6.35 6.26
100.0 9.1% 5.1%
No DRS 0 % 0 27 Me . 0 11 (2) 95.0% 6.96 39(27) 0en (0 Mean: (37)(27) 6.50 6.25
9.5% 7.4%
2 Years (2) 90.5% 0 21 0 100% 0 6 (2) 92.6% 6.98 27
Financials Mean (19) (6) Mean: (25)
6.68 6.68
2.3% 31.6% 16.4%
3+ Years (1) 97.7% 0 44 (6) 68.4% 0 19 (11) 83.6% 6.87 67
Financials Mean: (43) Mean: (13) Mean (56)
6.75 6.38 6.18
DRS + 2
Years 11.8% 9.5%
Financials (2) 88.2% 0 17 0 100% 0 4 (2) 90.5% 6.97 21(full Mean: (15) (4) Mean: (19)
- - 6.68 6.68
dadon)
11.1% 6.1%
Ae o- 0 0 23 88.9% (2) 94.0% 6.95 33
o (23) 023 a Mean: (31)dain6.50 6.25
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Table 4-Effect ofAccommodation on Gross Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proceeds -0.020*** -0.022***(.000) (.000)
DRS -1.531* -- 1.862**DRS 
- (5(.036)
Less than 3 Years of 0.898 0.118
Financials (.267) (.912)
Constant 4.818** 2.918*** 1.627*** 6.398***(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
N 94 94 94 94
Chi2 13.21*** 3.62* 1.23 15.10***
Pseudo R2 .379 .063 .019 .433
' Significant at the 10 % level.
- Significant at the 5 % level.
- Significant at the 1 % level.
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